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Background of Sarbanes-Oxley 2002
Out of the ashes of Enron arose Sarbanes-Oxley 2002. Enron began as a small
gas pipeline company and quickly rose into corporate prominence, at one time reaching
as high as seventh on the Fortune Fifty. While it is possible for companies to reach great
heights in small amounts of time and do so legally, Enron chose the quickest path
regardless of consequences. Often in the corporate world individuals in positions of
power will take the risk that any financial reporting fraud they may engineer will never
be discovered. In the 1970s and 1980s great emphasis was placed on a company's stock
price. Stock began directly correlating to the chief executive officer's salary through a
complicated system of executive stock compensation plans. These plans were of added
financial benefit to the company, at least on paper, because most companies did not
expense stock options.
Also during this time analysts as well as investors demanded that a company's
earnings rise steadily, in a predictable straight line. Any deviation, no matter how
insignificant, would cause the stock prices to change. Growth in a straight line is
virtually impossible; no company grows in constant increments. Another important
element to remember when talking about corporations not meeting profit expectations is
the executive's ego. The 90s created star-like executives, complete with private jets and
Hollywood parties. Executives began to compete with each other with respect to
personal income and perks. Improvement in corporate stock value led to increased social
standing for the executives. Outside pressures along with the fear of failure can easily
persuade a CEO to be creative with financial numbers. Enron created several off balance
sheet financial agreements, which allowed the company to overstate revenues as well as
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to understate expenses and liabilities. Merrill Lynch has recently pied guilty to assisting
in establishing a deal in which Enron was to sell their financial holdings in a company but
Enron actually put up most of the money themselves, taking almost no money from the
other company. This allowed the company to create a false sale and a fake profit. While
it is easy to see where Enron began to collapse and even easier to see where to place the
blame, it is difficult to place blame on just certain individuals in a single company when
similar situations began popping up in corporations across the USA.
Geofferey Colvin offers criteria that lead to companies committing fraudulent
acts. "The first element is a baby company's culture in a giant company's body. One of
the most difficult phases in every company's life is growing from one person's reflection
into an institution of its own"(Colvin, 2003). This situation refers to an entrepreneur who
refuses to let the company expand to its own entity. Whenever something is to be done it
must either originate with the original owner or be approved by the CEO. This creates an
atmosphere in which employees do not feel able to approach the CEO about a possible
idea or criticism. Outside auditors also seem to have an issue standing up to the
executive.
"The second element is personal greed, exquisitely disguised as a sense of
entitlement. The founders and many others at these companies believed deeply that they
deserved everything they got, regardless of how they got it, because they had created
their success"(Colvin, 2003). Corporations of today are being run by individuals, many of
whom consider themselves to be of an intelligence far surpassing any normal individual.
Executive greed was enhanced by the reliance of corporate Board of Directors on huge

•
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stock option compensation packages. These powerful individuals saw the company as
their personal finance tool, to be used in any way at their discretion.
"The third element is slavery to the Wall Street
expectations machine. All these companies achieved huge
valuations during the bubble, often trading at giant
multiples. In such cases it takes only a quiver in underlying
earnings to bring the stock price tumbling. So the standing
order for executives within these companies was to make
their number and meet Wall Street's expectations at all
costs, especially because these founder CEOs would lose
tons of personal wealth- to which they were entitled! - if
the stock fell" (Colvin, 2003).

The company became tied to the CEO's ego and sense of personal pride. If the
CEO felt underpaid, well then he or she would have to create a boost in stock prices to
raise their compensation worth; if the company's numbers became questionable, then the
CEO would alter them in order to save face.
It is important to note that just as author Colvin states, none of these criteria

alone has the power to create a corporate crisis such as the one we find our business
world involved in but that all three in combination must be present.
Thus it seems simple to boil down the cause of the corporate turmoil to issues
concerning corporate governance. Management of a company has a fiduciary duty to the
investors. A fiduciary duty involves looking out for the best interests of another party as
well as making decisions that increase their well-being. Remember that this is not the
first time in history when investor confidence has been shattered. There are a number of
issues in the disaster that is corporate governance that have led directly to this immediate
crisis. Jorge Guerra gives a listing of the more common problems associated with
corporate governance:

•

Boedeker "executive compensation grossly disproportionate to
corporate results, stock promotion that has gone to an
extreme in the creation of very questionable or unproven
business concepts, misuse of corporate funds, trading on
insider information, particularly by managers exercising
stock options that have been rewarded short-term thinking,
misrepresentation of the true earnings and financial
condition of too many companies, and obstruction of
justice by concealing activities or destroying
evidence"(Guerra, 2003).

It is easy to look through this list and find corporations in which a number of these
problems existed and led to the company's ultimate demise. Enron was plagued by
executive stock compensation, which eventually led to the leaders of the corporation
selling their stock before the dissolution of the company while forcing employees to
retain their shares eventually resulting in massive losses of retirement funds.
Other companies also had problems with excessive executive compensation and
perks. Let us not forget about the very expensive shower curtain, which furnished the
housekeeper's bathroom, as well as the birthday party thrown for the executive's wife
featuring a live performance by Jimmy Buffet, all paid for out ofTyco's business funds.
It is important to realize that while the stock compensation and executive perks exposed
by the financial woes of companies the size of Enron and Tyco may seem to be recent
developments, the potential for these misuses of corporate power and funds is longstanding. Seventy years ago, in the aftermath of the stock market crash, two researchers
wrote about the danger of managers of large corporations being in a position to act in
their own best interests, regardless of whether those interests are aligned with the best
interests of the stockholders. These researchers warned against a situation in which the
shareholders who own the company cannot adequately control the agents who manage

5
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their property and warned that this was a danger of dispersion of ownership (Stelzer,
2004).
With blatant disregard for corporate ethics as well as the investing public
occurring more frequently and with greater consequences, the government recognized
that they must act quickly. Through the darkness and fog of corporate disillusionment
came Sarbanes-Oxley. Two different bills were circulating through the House and the
Senate after the economic earthquakes of the later part of 2002. However, it quickly
became apparent the corporate turmoil was far from over and the politicians realized that
something needed to be done quickly and a unified message needed to be sent. The two
bills merged into Sarbanes-Oxley (referred to as SOX) and was quickly passed by the
House of Representatives and the Senate. William Donaldson, the SEC Chairman, states
that SOX "has been heralded by government officials as the most important securities
legislation since the original federal securities laws of the 1930s, and it has effected a
dramatic change across the corporate landscape to reestablish investor confidence in the
integrity of corporate disclosures and financial reporting" (Guerra, 2003).
Even with the law now in place it is imperative that people continue to support the
movement to increase corporate responsibility and enforce what has been put into place.
"The Act includes sweeping changes in the areas of
corporate governance and federal securities law, including
reporting obligations, in response to recent corporate
scandals and bankruptcies such as those involving Enron
and WorldCom. The Act seeks to prevent the reoccurrence
of such scandals by increasing corporate accountability,
enhancing financial disclosure, strengthening audit
committees, and creating new and harsh criminal penalties
for violations." (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2003: effect on
the securitization industry, 2002).
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Sarbanes-Oxley has been surrounded by a cloud of skepticism, but continues to
forge ahead towards the goal of returning the corporation back to the shareholders. A
difficult road lies ahead but two sections of the Act seek to add at least superficial support
to investors by requiring top-level executives to put their own futures on the line and
certify that the company's financial statements are to their best knowledge correct and
non-misleading.
Discussion of Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley
Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires that CEOs and CFOs of all public
companies certify each annual and quarterly report. "The certification states that to their
best knowledge the report does not contain any untrue statement or omission of a material
fact, and fairly represents in all material respects the company's financial condition and
results of operations" (Sarbanes-Oxley certification requirements and best practices,
2002). The securities legislation that was created back in the 1930s also sought to protect
the stock consumers from misrepresentations by management. The idea of Section 302 is
to reaffirm shareholder confidence; this has created a clash between professional levels.
Executives are now being required to include any additional knowledge of underlying
events as well as choosing the appropriate accounting methods that are in the best interest
of the shareholder. The CEO and CFO sign a standardized form of certification, which
may not be changed under any circumstances. The certification form is attached to the

lOK report.
According to the SEC (Sarbanes-Oxley certification requirements and best practices,
2002) there are six different elements to the certification by the CEOs and CFOs:
1. He or she has reviewed the periodic report
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2. Based on his or her knowledge, the periodic report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by the
periodic report
3. Based on his or her knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in the periodic report, fairly present in all material respects
the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of,
and for, the periods presented in the periodic reports
4. He or she and the other certifying officer
a. Are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and
procedures for the company
b. Have designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
material information is made known to them, particularly during the
period in which the periodic report is being prepared
c. Have evaluated the effectiveness of the company's disclosure controls and
procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of the
periodic report
d. Have presented in the periodic report their conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on the
required evaluation as of that date
5. He or she and the other certifying officer have disclosed to the company's auditor
and to the audit committee of the board of directors
a. All significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls
which could adversely affect the company's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial data and have identified for the company's
auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls
b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the company's internal controls
6. He or she and the other certifying officer have indicated in the periodic report
whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or in other
factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of
their evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant
deficiencies and material weaknesses. ·

Sarbanes-Oxley 2002 also discusses the concept of materiality. Materiality is really
found "in the eye of the beholder" (Sarbanes-Oxley certification requirements and best
practices, 2002). Information must stand up to the reasonable person standard. This
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particular standard implies that information will be considered to be material in nature if
the ordinary, reasonable user of the information would consider it when making
decisions.
The new legislation also proposes that management go above and beyond in terms of
keeping shareholders informed. Governmental officials found it imperative that
executives realize that merely conforming to generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) would no longer suffice. According to the SEC in Sarbanes-Oxley Certification
Requirements and Best Practices (2002) a fair presentation of a company's financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows encompasses the following points:
1) The selection of appropriate accounting policies
2) The proper application of appropriate accounting policies
3) The disclosure of financial information that is informative and reasonably
reflects the underlying transactions and events
4) The inclusion of any additional disclosures necessary to provide investors
with a materially accurate and complete picture of a company's financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows.
"The statement also contains language regarding
maintenance of disclosure controls and procedures. For
purposes of the new rules, the term disclosure controls and
procedures means controls and other procedures of a
company that are designed to ensure that information
required to be disclosed by the company in the reports file
by it under the Exchange Act is recorded, processed,
summarized, and reported within the time periods specified
in the SEC's rules and forms" (Sarbanes-Oxley
certification requirements and best practices, 2002).

This new definition is included in order to comment on the importance of information
disclosure. Companies must continue to maintain and update their commitment to
keeping shareholders properly informed.
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Discussion of Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley
On the surface Section 906 may seem to be a mere continuation of Section 302
but there are important differences to be noted. Section 906 exceeds the severity of
Section 302 in that it imposes criminal sanctions "for knowingly false certifications"
(Sarbanes-Oxley certification requirements and best practices, 2002). However, the
certification requirements actually referred to in Section 906 are more specific than the
requirements of Section 302. "The Section 906 certification represents that the periodic
report which it accompanies fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Exchange Act and that the information contained in the periodic report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
company" (Sarbanes-Oxley certification requirements and best practices, 2002).
Section 906 also carries harsh criminal penalties for violators. Any officer who
makes the certification knowing that the periodic report does not comport with the
requirements set forth can be fined not more than one million dollars or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both, or if the violation is willful, can be fined not more that five
million dollars or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
While both sections discussed above have found themselves embroiled in
controversy, Section 906 seems to raise the most concerns. One of the issues involves
the placement of the certification form required for Section 906. Part of the problem
hinges on the inclusion of the certification within the financial report and whether or not
the executives would then potentially also be liable for civil penalties (Sarbanes-Oxley
certification requirements and best practices, 2002). Even though the two sections are
similar there has been no conclusive action to incorporate them into one certification
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form and filing. Also there has been some controversy concerning the opinion that the
Section 906 certification can be viewed as private conversation between the SEC and the
particular company. As of now there is no penalty for failure to file a Section 906
certification form and penalties can only occur if certifications are made and they related
to false financial reports.
August 14, 2002, was the date that the first signed certifications were to be turned
m. "Cynics have called it 'restatement' day while others deemed it as inconsequential as
theY2K threat. Optimists hope it will mark the end of the worst year for corporate
scandals in recent memory" (Taub, 8/14/2002). In all about 947 companies must certify
their statements but many companies had different deadlines due to the fact that they do
not report on a calendar year basis. Several companies felt the need to revisit prior year
figures and restate figures before signing off on this year's financials (Taub, 8/15/2002).
"One theme seemed crystal clear-CEOs and CFOs don't want to go to jail" (Taub,
8/15/2002). While the day passed with little additional scandal, it seems that
shareholders were not incredibly swayed by the act of confidence. It may appear on the
surface that not much had been affected by the first round of signatures; however, it is
important to remember that Sarbanes-Oxley's impact will still have far reaching
implications in the accounting environment.

Discussion of Research Project
When I began this research project I believed that I would find some major
differences in reporting between the 2001 and 2002 financial reports of major
corporations. My research question was, "What was the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley
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Act of 2002 on the corporate reporting of the top 50 corporations in America as identified
by Fortune magazine." Each year Fortune magazine lists the top 500 public corporations
in American with the rankings based upon revenues. The results of the 2001 financial
reports of these corporations led to the 2002 listing in the magazine; the results of the
2002 financial reports led to the 2003 listing. To narrow the research down to a
manageable level, I decided to focus on the top fifty of these public corporations. These
companies are listed in Appendix A.
Once these corporations were identified, I needed to gather the information
reported by these corporations. I focused my research on the annual reports of the
companies as well as information retrieved from the SEC' s EDGAR website. I gathered
the 2001 and 2002 annual reports as well as 10-K filings for the companies included on
the 2002 list.
I set up an initial spreadsheet document to gather the information gleaned from
these annual reports and SEC filings. I looked at the following specific information:
1) Did these corporations file the required CEO and CFO statements with the
SEC?
2) If the corporations filed the required statements, were those statements
found in the annual report to the stockholders or only in the filings with
the SEC?
3) What audit firm was used in 2001 and in 2002; ifthere was a change in
auditor, what reasoning was given in the SEC filing?
4) Was Sarbanes-Oxley mentioned in management's letter to the
stockholders in the annual report; if so, what information was shared
concerning the effect of SOX on the corporate reporting?
5) Were there changes in the reporting and disclosure of related party
transactions, or disclosures of joint ventures previously held off balance
sheet?
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6) How was executive stock compensation reported each year; if the method
of reporting changed, what was the explanation given in the footnotes to
the financial statements?
As I read through these annual reports, focusing on the management letters and
the notes to the financial statements, I began to realize that there were very few
differences in the reporting between the two years. Of the Fortune 50 from 2002, only
one (Enron) failed to provide the necessary statements to the SEC; only ten of these
companies included the statements in the annual report while the others simply included
them in the SEC filings. Other than those companies who had used Arthur Anderson as
their auditor, there were only two changes in auditor reported. A few of the management
letters included in the annual reports discussed corporate ethics and the ways in which
those particular companies utilized an Audit Committee from the Board of Directors to
enhance internal control.
One possible conclusion from my research is that well-run corporations did not
need to make sweeping changes to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley. A more likely
conclusion is that Sarbanes-Oxley had just been passed and the reporting requirements
were just being implemented; therefore, many corporations simply complied with the
statement requirements for the CEO and CFO and will be making additional changes in
the future. It is also very likely that Sarbanes-Oxley will have more of an impact on the
public auditors than the public corporations. Public accounting firms are going to have to
determine whether they wish to provide management advisory services or audit services
to a corporation, and will have to change their fee structures so that audit services can
stand alone financially rather than being subsidized by profits on the management
advisory services provided to that corporation.
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Realizing that I was not going to find the data to support my original statement of
purpose, I decided to look again at Sarbanes-Oxley and its origin. After reading through
many articles discussing the impetus for SOX 02, I realized that there were three main
accounting issues that were at the center of the storm, so to speak:
1) Off balance sheet financing and investing activities, such as those involving
Enron that were not adequately disclosed to the users of the financial statements.
Some of these activities involved related party transactions with inadequate
disclosure and others disclosed the nature of the activity without disclosing the
true level of risk involved.
2) Executive perks and excess expenses, such as those involving Tyco executives,
which seriously eroded company earnings.
3) Stock based compensation plans for executives that often allowed top executives
to pull in millions more in compensation than that reported to the users of the
financial statements.
Of these three activities that contributed to the atmosphere that led to SarbanesOxley, I decided to explore the area of stock-based compensation plans more thoroughly.

In my opinion unexpensed stock options were a main factor in the corporate fallout.
Stock options created a forest of money trees and unrestricted power.
"Thanks to their free money allure, options made up more
than 40 percent of executive compensation during the late '90s.
This gave executives an enormous incentive to pursue risky, even
illegal strategies to boost stock prices so they could exercise their
options and immediately sell their stock" (Sweeney, 2001).
This was one area that the annual reports had to address, either through the financial
statements themselves or through the notes to the financial statements.
For many years the authoritative pronouncement regarding the treatment of stockbased compensation plans has been APB Opinion No. 25, Accounting for Stock Issued to
Employees. Under APB 25 corporations were allowed to use the intrinsic value method
in reporting compensation expense related to these stock-based compensation plans.
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Under the intrinsic value method the value of a fixed stock option for reporting purposes
is equal to the difference between the option exercise price and the market price at the
grant date. So, as long as a corporation set the exercise price at the current market price
of the stock, no expense would be recorded either at the time of option or the time of
exercise.
· So, as an example, let us say that Corporation X gives its CEO options on 10,000
shares at $20 per share in 2000 when the market price is also $20 per share. No
compensation expense would be recorded with respect to that grant. Now, if the CEO
exercises those options in 2003 when the market price is $30 per share, the CEO will be
receiving compensation of $100,000 ($30 - $20) times the 10,000 shares. Under the
intrinsic value method, there would still be no compensation expense reported in the
financial statements.
The accounting profession has been concerned over this treatment of stock-based
compensation plans and FASB began work on this issue in the early 1990s. In 1994
FASB proposed that stock-based compensation expense be recognized annually over the
life of the grant, with annual comparisons to the current market value of the options. As
Warren Buffett stated in the 1993 annual report of Berkshire Hathaway, "If options aren't
a form of compensation, what are they? If compensation isn't an expense, what is it?
And if expenses shouldn't go into the calculation of earnings, where in the world should
they go?"
Under the fair value method ofreporting stock-based compensation plans, our
previous example would have resulted in the actual expensing of the $100,000 during the
two years that the option was in place.
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This proposed statement set off a huge outcry from the corporate world that if this
accounting policy was adopted corporations would have to take large hits to income as a
result of these stock-based compensation plans, which they said would slow the
economic growth of the country. These corporations went to their congressmen and
women and the issue was debated in the House and Senate. The U.S. Senate threatened
to legislate accounting rules ifFASB persisted with this change in accounting for stockbased compensation, with one Senator remarking "I will not allow U.S. companies to be
sacrificed for the sake of double-entry accounting rules; if necessary, we will legislate
accounting rules" (Sweeney, 2001).
FASB felt the better course of valor was to back off, and Statement 123,
Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation, was issued. Statement 123 is very much a
compromise statement. Corporations are still allowed to use the intrinsic value method of
accounting for stock-based compensation plans; however, they are encouraged to adopt
the fair value method. If a company chooses to continue using the intrinsic value
method, they are required to disclose in a note the details of the option plans outstanding,
including the exercise price, the length of the contract period, and the fair value of the
options as well as what their net income would have been if they had used the fair value
method. This somewhat mollified those accountants who believed that all compensation
expense should be reported as an expense in the Statement of Earnings with the effect on
net income clearly shown while allowing those opposed to the expensing of the options to
keep the expense off the face of the Statement of Earnings.
A few companies in the Fortune 50 of 2002 have already begun to adopt the fairvalue method of accounting for these stock-based compensation plans. These include
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General Electric, Citigroup, Proctor and Gamble, and Warren Buffett's Berkshire
Hathaway. Others, including AT&T moved to the fair-value method in their 2003
reports. These companies are leading the way and are reporting this compensation
expense on the face of the earnings statement. Some companies, including Microsoft,
have discontinued the practice of compensating executives with stock options (Risen,
2003).
Other companies in the Fortune 50 are continuing to take the easy way out and are
complying with the form rather than the spirit, of Statement 123. They are providing the
information in a buried footnote, along with the pro forma information showing what the
income would have been if the fair value method had been included. What has struck me
as very interesting is that a few companies have gone into a belligerent, defensive mode
in writing this footnote.
"We are continuing to follow APB 25 with respect to
reporting stock-based compensation plans. We provide the
following information required by Statement 123 regarding
changes to net income if expense had been recognized as a
result of these plans. However, we continue to believe that
stock-based compensation plans do not represent an
expense to the corporation; these plans only have value if
the executives assist in increasing shareholder value and
therefore should only impact the shareholders' equity
section of the balance sheet" (Wells Fargo 2002 Annual
Report).

An article in the December 2003 Journal of Accountancy noted that "many
accounting experts think it is only a matter of time before companies will have to report
stock options as an expense at fair value" (Myers, 2002). Many accounting experts are
disappointed that corporations are merely following the letter of the law of Statement
123, continuing to employ the intrinsic value method rather than moving toward
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reporting under the fair value method of these stock-based compensation plans. In March
2004 FASB introduced a new exposure draft that is intended to lead toward option
expensing beginning in 2005. The current SEC chairman is fully supporting this new
standard (Loomis, 2004).
Congress appears ready to get involved in this debate once again, this time on the
other side of the debate. In the early 1990s, it was siding with the corporations in
blocking FASB's efforts to require the use of fair value accounting for these plans. Now
Congress appears ready to assist in encouraging corporations to adopt the fair value
reporting method. A bill has been introduced requiring corporations to treat stock options
the same way on its tax returns as it treats them on its financial statements. Currently a
corporation has been allowed to use the intrinsic value method for its financial
statements, showing no expense, while simultaneously being allowed to take a tax
deduction for the value of the options.
If FASB does decide to require the use of the fair value method in expensing
these stock-based compensation plans, another issue will immediately arise: what
alternative pay programs should corporations consider? If one of the main reasons for the
popularity of the stock-based compensation plans was related to the lack of an accounting
charge on the books, once there is an accounting charge options are on a level playing
field with other incentives. Corporations and their compensation committees will then
need to look at the full range of compensation plans and select the one that best fits its
goals.
Summary of Research Project
I began my exploration of Sarbanes-Oxley 2002 with the expectation that I would
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find significant changes in the reporting of major corporations. In that, I was wrong.
Sarbanes-Oxley has had a much more profound impact in the areas of internal control and
limitation of management advisory services provided by CPA firms than it has had in the
actual reporting arena.
When I began to focus on stock-based compensation plans, it soon became
obvious that in spite ofFASB Statement 123 most of these corporations (a staggering 41
of 50, or 82 percent) were continuing to use the intrinsic value method ofreporting these
plans. As I stated earlier, some of these corporations were even belligerent about having
to provide the proforma information required by Statement 123. Many accounting
industry insiders have noted that Sarbanes-Oxley was quickly written and passed and that
it will take time and revision before the true intent of the law becomes a reality. I
definitely found this to be true in the area ofreporting, particularly with respect to stockbased compensation plans.
It is difficult to assess the successes and failures of Sarbanes-Oxley when so many
problems and questions remain. There seem to be many unintentional repercussions of
the legislation partly due to the hasty nature with which SOX was passed.
At the time Sarbanes-Oxley was being implemented, the national economy was
suffering a downturn due in large part to the lack of investor confidence. Many people
believe that Sarbanes-Oxley has impeded the economy's recovery by stifling CEOs with
rules and regulations. The consequences created by this new legislation have created a
new brand of executive who is increasingly conservative.
"Managers of successful companies must take business
risks. The directors who oversee them must encourage
them to do so. I want to be clean using business judgment;
taking risks; and even losing money when a risk worth
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taking materializes, does not act against the notion of good
corporate governance. In my view, good corporate
governance informs good business judgment. It
compliments risk taking" (Millstein, 2003).
It is imperative that leading executives realize that Sarbanes-Oxley

attempts to increase investor confidence through executive reliability. It
does not mean that leaders cannot continue to take business risks. It just
implies that the risks taken must be legal and non-misleading in nature and
in the event of failure; executives must continue to be truthful to investors
in their disclosures. In order for the economy to improve CEOs must once
again take risks in order to increase company profitability.
"The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and stringent new oversight of the accounting
profession are causing friction in the once-smooth relationship between management and
outside auditors" (Farrell & Backover, 2003). With the fall of major corporations also
came the demise of the aura of the auditing profession as watchdogs of investor wellbeing. Arthur Anderson's disappearance increased the vulnerability of the remaining
firms. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, auditors found their current practices under tremendous
scrutiny. It is hard to pin down exactly when outside auditors actually became company
insiders. The accounting industry realized that there was higher profitability to be
experienced in selling consulting services than in selling quality audits. Auditors began
advising executives on the best way to cheat the system while turning a blind eye to
questionable accounting practices.
With the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley auditors now find themselves in a real
dilemma. Gone are the days where accounting firms could sell unlimited consulting
services to a company and audit the same company. Auditors must now scrutinize

~-
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financial statements and accounting practices. Many firms have pressed companies for
restatement of prior year financial statements.
"Last summer, the first wave of these signatures arrived at the SEC without much
incident. But if some of the current battles result in restatements, those signatures could
come back to haunt their owners. "You will see an unbelievable amount of fingerpointing in the next few months from CEOs that all signed off last August" (Farrell &
Backover, 2003).
Already some companies are siding with the auditors and showing their
executives the door. It remains to be seen what type of relationship between auditors and
executives will be created in the post Sarbanes-Oxley era.
Along with Sarbanes-Oxley came increased compliance costs. Companies must
pay for internal control programs as well as increased insurance costs for both executives
and board members. These increased costs have made more public companies rethink the
benefits associated with being a public company.
"The number of U.S. public companies to announce
privatization plans has continued to steadily rise since the
inauguration of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Privatization
transaction announcements increase 30 percent following
the legislation's enactment from August 2002 to November
2003, in comparison to the 16-month period preceding the
Act's initiation form April 2001 to July 2002" (Grant
Thornton Press Release, 12/15/2003).
There are many benefits to be found in going private. "By going private,
companies can greatly reduce their level of risk associated with shareholder litigation,
while cutting costs and regaining a sense of control and confidentiality. For many
companies, theses benefits are very appealing" (Grant Thornton Press Release,
12/15/2003). It is important to note that many of the companies going private were really
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public companies in name only. Also of considerable importance is the slow down being
experienced in the IPO market. Many companies who had previously considered going
public are changing their minds and are staying private.
Sarbanes-Oxley came out of the remains of a corporate culture created by failure
at every level of the system.
"We looked away as directors gave free reign to CEOs and
management. We looked away from unprecedented CEO
compensation. We looked away as accountants, bankers,
and lawyers replaced responsibilities to the corporation and
it shareholders with loyalty to the management team that
hired them. And as shareholders, we stopped paying
attention; we stopped reading footnotes. We were so
enamored by performance that we just didn't care about
why and how it was happening" (Millstein, 2003).
Because of this massive failure at every level, Sarbanes-Oxley will face many challenges
associated with being a hastily passed piece of legislation. One of the most interesting
moments in the near future regarding the effectiveness of Sarbanes-Oxley will be the trial
ofHealthSouth's former CEO Richard Scrushy. As of December Scrushy's lawyers were
planning a lawsuit regarding the constitutional validity of section 906's criminal
penalties. Scrushy's lawyers contend that the wording of this particular segment is too
vague and should be considered void (Taub, 12/11/2003).
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 seeks to prevent the reoccurrence of recent
scandals by increasing corporate accountability, enhancing financial disclosure,
strengthening audit committees, and creating new and harsh criminal penalties for
violations" (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Effect on the Securitization Industry,
2002). Sarbanes-Oxley has been surrounded by a cloud of skepticism, but continues to
forge ahead towards the goal of returning the corporation back to the shareholders. A
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difficult road lies ahead but these two sections of the Act seek to add support to investors
by requiring top-level executives to put their own futures on the line and certify that the
company's financial statements are to their best knowledge correct and non-misleading.
"How real is corporate reform? The test will come in the next bull market, when
the temptation to cut comers will be back in force. Just avoiding jail should not be the
goal here ... It should be building great companies. That will depend on whether these
key groups have embraced the spirit of reform or just its letter" (Byrnes, Henry, Thornton
& Dwyer, 2003).

,
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Appendix A
Fortune 50 Companies, 2001
Annual Reports Studied for Fiscal Years Covering 2001 and 2002

Wal-Mart
Exxon Mobile
General Motors
Ford Motor
Enron
General Electric
Citigroup
Chevron Texaco
IBM
Philip Morris (Altria Group)
Verizon Communications
American International Group
American Electric Power
Duke Energy
AT&T
Boeing
El Paso
Home Depot
Bank of America Corporation
Fannie Mae
J.P. Morgan Chase
Kroger
Cardinal Health
Merck
State Farm Insurance

SBC Communications
Hewlett Packard
Morgan Stanley
Dynegy
McKesson
Sears Roebuck
Aquila
Target
Procter & Gamble
Merril Lynch
AOL Time Warner
Albertson's
Berkshire Hathaway
Kmart
Freddie Mac
WorldCom
Marathon Oil
Costco Wholesale
Safeway
Compaq Computers
Johnson & Johnson
Conoco
Pfizer
J.C. Penney
Reliant Energy
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